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Abstract—Face recognition has achieved great success in the
last five years due to the development of deep learning methods.
However, deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) have been
found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. In particular,
the existence of transferable adversarial examples could severely
hinder the robustness of DCNNs since this type of attacks could
be applied in a fully black-box manner without queries on the
target system. In this work, we first investigate the characteristics
of transferable adversarial attacks in face recognition by showing
the superiority of feature-level methods over label-level methods.
Then, to further improve transferability of feature-level adver-
sarial examples, we propose DFANet, a dropout-based method
used in convolutional layers, which could increase the diversity
of surrogate models and obtain ensemble-like effects. Extensive
experiments on state-of-the-art face models with various training
databases, loss functions and network architectures show that the
proposed method can significantly enhance the transferability
of existing attack methods. Finally, by applying DFANet to the
LFW database, we generate a new set of adversarial face pairs
that can successfully attack four commercial APIs without any
queries. This TALFW database is available to facilitate research
on the robustness and defense of deep face recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) haveachieved great success in face recognition [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]. In unconstrained environments, the face
recognition performance is reaching saturation levels on sev-
eral benchmarks, e.g., LFW [8], MegaFace [9] and IJB-
A [10]. Even in the real security certificate environment,
which requires a very low false positive rate [11], state-of-
art performance has been achieved [7]. Although deep face
models have already surpassed human performance [12], [13]
on some benchmarks, we must keep in mind that benchmarks
may not be able to capture realistic performance [14]. Due
to the remarkable performance, face recognition applications
could be numerous as well as diverse in our daily lives and
could be used in security agencies, law enforcement agencies,
the airline industry, the banking and securities industries and
so on, which further increases the demand for security in deep
face models.
Researchers found that the basis of deep face models,
DCNNs, can be easily fooled by adversarial examples, which
are modified from original test images by adding noise not
imperceptible to humans [15], [16]. Moreover, adversarial
examples are transferable in different models [17], [18], [19],
[20], which means that black-box attacks can be launched
The authors are with the Pattern Recognition and Intelligent System
Laboratory, School of Information and Communication Engineering, Beijing
University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China (e-mail:
zhongyaoyao@bupt.edu.cn; whdeng@bupt.edu.cn).
Fig. 1. A transferable adversarial face pair. The original face pair is shown
on the left, which contains two face images of different identities. Although
perturbation of the modified face image is imperceptible, the similarity score
of four commercial APIs changed significantly.
from the local surrogate models without having information
on the remote target systems, including network architectures,
network parameters, training databases and defensive methods.
Face recognition systems are not robust as we think when
test images are not drawn from the same distribution as the
training images. Previous works have already demonstrated the
existence of the vulnerability of deep face models [21], [22],
[23]. However, previous works in white-box settings [21], [24]
assume that the attacker has full access to the target models.
Query-based methods in black-box settings [23] require a large
number of queries, which could be detected relatively easily
by the target system. Both settings are not practical in real-
world situations because the remote target system can neither
release the network information proactively nor allow a large
number of queries on a face pair.
In contrast, transferable adversarial attacks could severely
hinder robustness since this type of attack could be applied in
a fully black-box manner without any queries on the target
system. We demonstrate that, with this type of adversarial
attack, state-of-art face models and even commercial APIs
could be easily attacked, as shown in Fig. 1. Both the original
face pair and the modified face pair are shown. The face
images of the original pair belong to different identities while
the modified pair are judged as the same identity by four
commercial APIs: Amazon [25], Microsoft [26], Baidu [27]
and Face++ [28]. Because of the great potential harms of
transferable adversarial attacks in deep face recognition, it is
valuable to study this issue in a black-box setting without any
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Although recent works have investigated the transferability
of adversarial examples [17], [18], [19], [20] in DCNNs
used for close-set object classification tasks [29], [30], [31],
some works remained to be done on transferable adversarial
attacks in deep face recognition because of the particularity
of deep face models. First, face recognition is an open-set
task, and deep face models are more like a feature extractor
where the test identities are usually different from the training
identities [4]. Second, compared with the 1,000 categories of
ImageNet [31], the number of identities/categories could be in
the millions [32]. Based on these two points of particularity,
it is difficult to generate transferable target attacks because of
the absence of accurate labels for both the source and target
images.
In addition, we have no knowledge of a target black-
box deep face model for which there are a wide range of
options for its training databases [33], [32], [34], [35], training
loss functions [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] and network
architectures [36], [37], [38], [39]. Because it has been widely
accepted both in academia and industry that these three key
pieces of information could improve recognition performance,
there are still many works insisting on designing new, effec-
tive ones, which will undoubtedly increase the difficulty of
attacking a black-box face model.
The objective of this work is to study transferable ad-
versarial attacks towards deep face models, i.e., to generate
adversarial face pairs from surrogate models and lead the
black-box face models to misjudge these generated face pairs
by depending only on the transferability without any queries
of the target models. Furthermore, to simulate the potential
scenarios, we aim to increase the difference between source
and target models by attacking deep face models with dif-
ferent training datasets, training loss functions, and network
architectures. To this end, considering the aforementioned
characteristics and particularity, we first start by investigating
the applicable strategies of transferable adversarial attacks
against deep face recognition to select a suitable baseline
method. To further improve the transferability of adversarial
examples, we propose the dropout face attacking network
(DFANet), a dropout-based method used in convolutional
layers. DFANet could be combined with existing black-box
attack enhancement methods to achieve further improvements
over them by increasing the diversity of surrogate models and
preventing the overfitting of adversarial examples to them.
Finally, based on our study, we contribute an adversarial
face database as a benchmark to facilitate research on the
robustness and defense of deep face recognition.
The main contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We show that feature-level attack is more effective than
commonly used label-level attack towards deep face-
recognition models. Furthermore, we empirically demon-
strate that momentum boosting method [19], diverse input
method [20], and model ensemble method [17] are useful
to improve the transferability of the feature-level attacks.
They can be combined to provide a strongest attacking
method.
• We propose a dropout face attacking networks (DFANet),
which applies a dropout-based strategy to a variety of
deep CNNs to enhance the transferability of adversarial
attacks. Extensive experiments show that the proposed
method can be combined with previous transferability
enhancement methods [17], [19], [20], which obtain more
effective black-box adversarial attacks towards the state-
of-the-art face models with different training databases,
loss functions and network architectures.
• Based on the proposed DFANet, we generate the ad-
versarial images from the well-known LFW database
with visually imperceptible noise, which provides a new
database, TALFW, to serve as a benchmark to evaluate the
robustness of deep face models. With the same protocol
as the LFW database, four state-of-the-art algorithms and
four commercial APIs yield unpleasant performance on
the TALFW database. The severe degradation clearly
shows the vulnerability of deep face-recognition models
even with massive training data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II briefly reviews the literature related to adversarial attacks,
deep face recognition, and adversarial attacks towards deep
face models. In Section III, we first introduce the applicable
strategies of transferable adversarial attacks towards deep face
recognition. Then, we present the proposed method and in-
corporate it into existing transferability enhancement methods
to further improve adversarial transferability. In Section IV,
we first demonstrate the superiority of the feature-level attack
method and select it as the baseline method. Next, we evaluate
the proposed method on deep face models with different train-
ing databases, loss functions and network architectures. Then,
we provide an ablation study on hyperparameters and provide
some interpretation of the intermediate generation process of
adversarial examples for better comprehension of DFANet.
Finally, we adopt the proposed method to the LFW database
and build the TALFW database. Section V summarizes the
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we briefly review the literature related
to adversarial attacks, deep face recognition, and adversarial
attacks against deep face models.
A. Adversarial Attacks
Previous works have discovered that, with elaborate strate-
gies, DCNNs can be easily fooled by test images with imper-
ceptible noise [15]. This type of image is called adversarial
examples. The existence of adversarial examples has led to a
variety of studies on adversarial defenses [15], [40], [41]. The
robustness of DCNNs is crucial; therefore, adversarial attacks
and defenses draw great attention. A comprehensive survey in
the field of computer vision tasks can be found in [42].
Adversarial examples can be classified as white-box at-
tacks [15], [16], [43], [44], [45] and black-box attacks [18],
[19], [46], [47]. White-box attacks assume that the attacker
knows everything about the target models, including the
network architectures, network parameters, training databases
3and even defensive methods. Black-box attacks assume that
the attacker has no access to the target model. Some works
broaden this restriction and assume that the attacker can obtain
the output of the model (label or confidence score). Therefore,
theses works have developed a serious of query-based attack
methods. In this paper, we assume that the attacker only has
one chance to attack a face pair; therefore, they can only
leverage the transferability of adversarial examples without
any queries.
First, we introduce mainstream white-box attacks [15], [16],
[43], [44], [45]. Szegedy et al. [15] first found that they
can cause DCNNs to misclassify images by a certain hardly
perceptible perturbation generated using a box-constrained L-
BFGS method. Compared with L-BFGS attacks [15], Good-
fellow et al. [16] proposed a more time-saving and practical
method, referred to as the fast gradient sign method (FGSM),
which generates the adversarial perturbation ∆x from the
source image x(s) to build an adversarial example xadv =
x(s) +∆x, by performing one-step gradient updating along the
direction of the sign of the gradient at each pixel:
xadv = x(s) + ∆x = x(s) + εsign(∇x(s) J(x(s), y(s))), (1)
where J represents the cross-entropy loss, ε limits the max-
imum deviation of the perturbation. To generate adversarial
examples of a specific desired target class, the fast target
gradient sign method (FTGSM) [44] leads the model to
misclassify a source image x(s) with label y(s) as another target
category y(t), which satisfies y(t) , y(s), which is formulated
as:
xadv = x(s) + ∆x = x(s) − εsign(∇x(s) J(x(s), y(t))). (2)
Moreover, a straightforward method called the basic iterative
method (BIM) [44] extends the FGSM by applying it multiple
times with a small step size and clip pixel values after each
step to ensure the L∞ constraint:
xadv,0 = x(s),
xadv,N+1 = Cx(s),ε(xadv,N+sign(∇xadv,N J(xadv,N, y(s)))),
(3)
where the iteration can be chosen to be min(ε + 4, 1.25ε)
and Cx,ε(x ′) = min(255, x + ε,max(0, x − ε, x ′)). Compared
with BIM [44], the iterative target gradient sign method
(ITGSM) [44] leads the model to misclassify a source image
x(s) with label y(s) as another target category y(t), which
satisfies y(t) , y(s), which is formulated as:
xadv,0 = x(s),
xadv,N+1 = Cx(s),ε(xadv,N−sign(∇xadv,N J(xadv,N, y(t)))).
(4)
According to [44], iterative methods can attack white-box
DCNNs at a higher rate than the fast method at the same
constraint level.
Finally, we introduce transferable black-box attacks [17],
[18], [19], [48], [20], [49], which are more practical in real-
world situations than white-box attacks and could severely hin-
der robustness. Researchers have discovered that attacking an
ensemble of multiple models simultaneously [17], [19] could
improve the transferability of adversarial images. Usually,
iterative attacks achieve a higher attack success rate than the
fast attack method in a white-box setting, but performs worse
when transferred to other models [44]. While Dong et al.
[19] proposed to integrate the momentum term into the attack
process to stabilize the update directions and escape from
poor local maxima, improving the transferability of iterative
attacks. Furthermore, Dong et al. [19] proposed a translation-
invariant attack method that optimizes a perturbation over an
ensemble of translated images. At the same time, Xie et al.
[20] proposed to improve the transferability of adversarial
examples by creating diverse input patterns, e.g., through
resizing, cropping and rotating. Wu et al. [49] proposed to
improve the transferability by using more gradients from the
skip connections rather than the residual modules according
to a decay factor.
B. Deep Face Recognition
Deep learning has brought great success to face recogni-
tion. A comprehensive survey can be referred to [50]. The
success could be mainly attributed to the large-scale training
databases [33], [32], [34], [35], effective training loss func-
tions [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] and advanced network
architectures [51], [1], [52], [53], [36], [34].
Large scale training databases play an import role in deep
face recognition, and we introduce four mainstream large scale
databases here. CAISA-WebFace [33] is the first widely used
large-scale training database in deep face recognition and
contains 0.49M images of 10,575 celebrities. At that time,
the scale of CASIA-WebFace ranked second, only smaller
than the private database of Facebook [51], which significantly
boosted the performance of face recognition performance on
the mainstream benchmark LFW [8]. MS-Celeb-1M [32] is
the first publicly available million-scale training database,
which originally contains 10M images of 100K celebrities.
Considering the existence of label noise [35], the cleaned
versions of MS-Celeb-1M are widely in academia today.
VGGFace2 [34] database has 3.31 million images of 9,131
identities and have large variations in pose, age, illumination,
ethnicity and profession. IMDb-Face [35] is a million-scale
noise-controlled training database, containing 1.7M images
of 59K identities, which is competitive as a training source
despite its relatively smaller size.
It has been widely accepted that learning discriminative
features is the key for open-set face recognition and the
major focus in deep face recognition has become to learn
a discriminative feature space by supervising networks using
effective loss function. Some loss functions are based on
Euclidean metric learning methods [1], [2], some of which
either minimize the distance between features in the positive
pair or maximize that in the negative pairs, or both. Some
loss functions modify softmax loss by incorporating weight
or feature normalization [54], [55], [56]. Another powerful
type of loss function is the large-margin softmax loss, mainly
containing SphereFace [4], CosFace [6] and ArcFace [7].
CosFace [6] and ArcFace [7] introduce additive margins to
guarantee convergence, which are easier to implement than
multiplicative margins, which are used by SphereFace [4].
4Large-margin softmax loss functions significantly boost the
performance, which seem to be the most effective loss func-
tions in deep face recognition.
Network architectures have also shown significant gains in
the deep face recognition literature. DeepFace [51] first uses
a 9-layer CNN with locally connected layers in face recogni-
tion, and achieves a 97.35% accuracy on the LFW database.
SphereNet [4] adopts a 64-layer ResNet [36] network, super-
vised by an advanced large-margin loss function, achieving a
99.42% accuracy on the LFW database. Adacos [57] adopts
an Inception-ResNet architecture [38] in face recognition and
reports comparable results. ArcFace [7] develops ResNet [36]
and squeeze-and-excitation network (SENet) [39] with an IR
block and achieves new state-of-art performance on several
benchmarks. In addition, lightweight deep face models aiming
at model compactness and computational efficiency have also
attracted attention [58], where MobileNet [37] has been proven
to be a successful attempt.
C. Attacks against Deep Face Models
Face recognition systems can be applied to domains in
which safety is crucial. Therefore, it is important to understand
the extent to which deep face models are subject to attacks.
Previous works have already investigated several attacks [21],
[59], [22], [23] and demonstrated the vulnerability of deep
face models.
A gradient-based attack method was first proposed in [21],
which restricts the perturbation to eyeglasses and physically
realizes impersonation and dodging attacks in deep face recog-
nition. Then the eyeglass attack was developed in [60] by
using generative methods. The LOTS attack was proposed
in [24] to form adversarial examples that mimic the deep
features of the target. LOTS was the first work to launch
feature-level attacks against deep face models, which shows
similarities to the technique of Sabour et al. [61] in terms
of directly adjusting internal feature representations. To date,
adversarial attacks against face models have mainly focused
on the white-box setting. Considering the impracticality of
the white-box setting, [23] proposed an evolutionary attack
method for query-based adversarial attacks in the decision-
based black-box settings.
Previous works explore attacks lie in two aspects: attacks in
white-box settings and attacks in black-box settings. Although
the attack success rate in the white-box settings [21], [24]
reaches almost 100%, this setting is not practical in real-world
situations because it assumes that the attacker has full access
to the target models. Query-based methods in the black-box
setting [23] are also effective in terms of the attack success
rate; however, these methods require a large number of queries,
that can be relatively easy detected by the target system.
[62], [63] proposed to attack deep face models by generating
adversarial examples with GANs, which can be transferred
to unseen models to some degree, but this type of method is
difficult to achieve.
Therefore, in this work, we aim to study the transferable
adversarial attacks against deep face models, which could
severely hinder the robustness since this type of attack is
launched in a fully black-box manner without any query
feedback. We investigate transferable gradient-based adversar-
ial attack methods and the corresponding new transferability
enhancement method. We generate adversarial examples using
surrogate models and propose a new transferability enhance-
ment method to increase the possibility of surrogate gradients
covering the target gradients. The proposed method achieves
a consistently high success attack rate. In addition, it is easy
and stable for implementation.
III. TRANSFERABLE ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST
DEEP FACE MODELS
In this section, we first introduce the applicable feature-
level adversarial attacks towards deep face models. Then
we propose the dropout face attacking networks (DFANet)
to further increase the transferability of adversarial attacks,
which could be combined with existing black-box attack
enhancement methods, and achieve improvements over them.
A. Adversarial Attacks against Deep Face Models
We start with some notations for the background of deep
face models and the corresponding adversarial attacks.
Deep Face Models. Let D = {x(i), y(i)} denote a labeled
database, where x(i) and y(i) ∈ {1, 2, ...,C} (C is the number of
identities) denote an input image and the corresponding label,
respectively. In the training process, a network with parameters
θN is originally trained on a database D by minimizing the
cross-entropy loss
J(x(i), y(i)) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
log p(y(i) |x(i), θN ), (5)
where N is the mini-batch size. In the cross entropy loss
function,
p(y(i) |x(i), θN ) = e
Wyi
T xi+byi∑C
j=1 e
Wj
T xi+b j
, (6)
where xi ∈ Rd denotes the embedding feature of the i-th
training image x(i), yi is the label of xi , Wj ∈ Rd is the j-
th column of the weight of the last fully connected layer, and
bj ∈ RC is the bias.
For a deep face model, in the training process, the net-
work obtains an input face image x(i), and then outputs the
probability p(y(i) |x(i), θN ) and the output label l(x(i)). In the
testing process, we use the face model as a feature extractor,
which means that we do not care about the softmax layer.
We only extract the normalized embedding feature of images
in the testing databases and make comparisons using distance
metrics such as the cosine similarity. Some softmax-based loss
functions [55], [4], [6], [7] remove the bias term, normalize the
embedding features, and incorporate the large margin, which
improves the recognition performance but does not change the
pipeline of deep face models.
Feature-level Attacks. Given a deep face model and a face
pair, denoted by {x(s), x(t)}, we compare this face pair by
calculating the distance between normalized deep represen-
tations F(x(s)) and F(x(t)). Note that in equation (6), xi ∈ Rd
denotes the embedding feature of the i-th training image x(i),
5while here, F(x(i)) is the deep feature after normalization,
which is primarily used for distance comparison in deep
face recognition. Ideally, the distance between features in a
negative pair is larger than that in a positive pair. However, to
explore the vulnerability of deep face models, we try to add
imperceptible perturbation ∆x on one of the face images x(s) to
generate an adversarial example xadv = x(s) +∆x and deceive
the face model. Therefore, for a positive face pair{x(s), x(t)},
where y(s) = y(t), the optimized objective can be formulated
as:
∆x = argmax
∆x
F(x(s) + ∆x) − F(x(t))
2
, ‖∆x‖∞ < ε, (7)
while for a negative face pair {x(s), x(t)}, where y(s) , y(t), the
optimized objective is:
∆x = argmin
∆x
F(x(s) + ∆x) − F(x(t))
2
, ‖∆x‖∞ < ε, (8)
where ε limits the maximum deviation of the perturbation. For
computational efficiency, we adopt the optimized loss function
J
(
x(s) + ∆x, x(t)
)
=
F (x(s) + ∆x) − F (x(t))
2
(9)
for negative pairs, and
J
(
x(s) + ∆x, x(t)
)
= −
F (x(s) + ∆x) − F (x(t))
2
(10)
for positive pairs to form adversarial perturbations in an fast
way, referred to as feature fast attack method (FFM)
x(s) + ∆x = Cx(s),ε(x(s) + sign(∇x(s) J(x(s), x(t)))), (11)
or in an iterative way, referred to as feature iterative attack
method (FIM) [64]
∆x0 = 0,
gN+1 = ∇x(s)+∆xN J
(
x(s) + ∆xN, x(t)
)
,
x(s) + ∆xN+1 = Cx(s),ε(x(s) + ∆xN + sign(gN+1)),
(12)
where Cx,ε(x ′) = min(255, x+ε,max(0, x−ε, x ′)); the iteration
can be chosen heuristically min(ε+4, 1.25ε). Note that in FFM
and FIM, the loss functions J are no longer the cross entropy
loss as Equation (5), but the feature-level loss functions in
Equation (7) and Equation (8).
B. Dropout Face Attacking Networks (DFANet)
To further improve the transferability of adversarial attacks,
there are some previous works on transferability enhancement
methods [17], [19], [48], [20], [49], which we reviewed in
Section II-A. The existing methods mainly improve the trans-
ferability of adversarial attacks by increasing the diversity and
variability of the gradient [19], [49], input images [48], [20],
and surrogate models [17] to prevent adversarial examples
overfitting to surrogate models and increase the possibility
that the surrogate gradients will cover the target gradients.
However, in existing methods, a surrogate deep face model
usually appears as a whole part, which can be expressed as
θN in Equation (5). The parameters θN always remain fixed
in the forward propagation and backpropagation process of
the adversarial example generation. In this work, we propose
an easy and general method by increasing the diversity and
variability in a surrogate model θN itself although surrogate
models have already been trained well and could be combined
with many existing transferability enhancement methods and
applied to a variety of convolutional neural network architec-
tures.
The basis of deep face models is deep convolutional neu-
ral networks (DCNNs) in which convolutional layers play
an important role. Since the aim is to further improve the
transferability by increasing the diversity and variability, we
incorporate dropout [65] in the convolutional layers in the
iterative steps of the generation process. Although dropout
has brought great success to DCNNs, it is primarily used
in the fully connected layers [66], [67] by dropping units
along with their connections during the training process to
improve the performance of the trained model. We use dropout
in the testing process when deep face models are used to
generate adversarial examples to improve the transferability
of adversarial examples. In this way, the dropout increases the
possible settings of the subnetworks and combines the possible
subnetworks in the iterative steps.
Specifically, for a face model composed of convolutional
layers, given the output oi ∈ Rn from the i-th convolutional
layer, we first generate a mask Mi ∈ Rn where each element
mi is independently sampled from a Bernoulli distribution with
probability pd:
mi ∼ Bernoulli (pd) , mi ∈ Mi . (13)
Then, we use this mask to modify the output as oi = Mi × oi ,
where × denotes the Hadamard product. We name this mod-
ified model as dropout face attacking networks (DFANet).
To obtain the ensemble effect of the random sampling of
the subnetworks, we incorporate the DFANet into the gen-
eration process of transferable adversarial examples. In the
N-th iterative step of the adversarial example generation,
we generate the mask Mi N for the output oi N of the i-
th convolutional layer using Equation (13), then change the
output to oi N = Mi N × oi N in the forward propagation
process. Accordingly, in the gradient backpropagation process,
the same mask is used. In the N-th iterative step, for an input
image x, the normalized deep representations can be denoted
by F˜N (x).
In this way, DFANet can be applied to the generation of
FIM (by Equation (12)) and combined with transferability
enhancement methods like momentum boosting method [19],
diverse input method [20], and model ensemble method [17].
To explain the generation process more clearly, we detail these
combinations of methods in turn. For convenience, we do not
detail the combination of DFANet and FIM here. We start
with DFANet-M-FIM, which is the combination of DFANet,
momentum boosting method, and FIM. DFANet-M-FIM is
shown in Algorithm 1, where the integrated momentum [68]
stabilizes the update directions and prevents the optimization
from dropping into poor local maxima. Specifically, gN+1
gathers the gradients of the first N + 1 iterations with a
decay factor µ. The combination of DFANet, diverse input
method, momentum boosting method, and FIM is referred to
6Algorithm 1: DFANet-M-FIM
Input: The face pair {x(s), x(t)}, maximum deviation of
perturbations ε, decay factor µ, maximum
iterative steps Nmax , deep face model F(·),
dropout probability pd .
1 Initialize: ∆x0 = 0, g0 = 0, N = 0;
2 while step N < Nmax do
3 Generate DFANet F˜N (x) of the N-th step (with pd);
4 JN
(
x(s) + ∆x, x(t)
)
= −
F˜N (x(s) + ∆x) − F˜N (x(t))
2
;
5 gN+1 = µ · gN +
∇
x(s)+∆xN J
(
x(s)+∆xN ,x(t )
)
‖∇
x(s)+∆xN J(x(s)+∆xN ,x(t ))‖
;
6 x(s) + ∆xN+1 = Cx(s),ε(x(s) + ∆xN + sign(gN+1));
7 end
Output: Adversarial example xadv = x(s) + ∆xNmax .
Algorithm 2: DFANet-DI-M-FIM
Input: The face pair {x(s), x(t)}, maximum deviation of
perturbations ε, maximum iterative steps Nmax ,
decay factor µ, stochastic image transform
function T (x; p), dropout probability pd .
1 Initialize: ∆x0 = 0, g0 = 0, N = 0;
2 while step N < Nmax do
3 Generate DFANet F˜N (x) of the N-th step (with pd);
4 JN
(
x(s) + ∆x, x(t)
)
= −
F˜N (x(s) + ∆x) − F˜N (x(t))
2
;
5 gN+1 = µ · gN +
∇
x(s)+∆xN J
(
T
(
x(s)+∆xN ;p
)
,x(t )
)
‖∇
x(s)+∆xN J(T (x(s)+∆xN ;p),x(t ))‖
;
6 x(s) + ∆xN+1 = Cx(s),ε(x(s) + ∆xN + sign (gN+1);
7 end
Output: Adversarial example xadv = x(s) + ∆xNmax .
Algorithm 3: DFANet-E-DI-M-FIM
Input: The face pair {x(s), x(t)}, maximum deviation of
perturbations ε, maximum iterative steps Nmax ,
decay factor µ, stochastic image transform
function T (x; p), dropout probability pd ,
ensemble weight wk (wk > 0, K deep face
models Fk(·), ∑Kk=1 wk = 1).
1 Initialize: ∆x0 = 0, g0 = 0, N = 0;
2 while step N < Nmax do
3 while model k < K do
4 Generate DFANet F˜N
k
(x) of the N-th step and the
k-th model (with pd);
5 end
6 JN
k
(
x(s) + ∆x, x(t)
)
= −
F˜Nk (x(s) + ∆x) − F˜Nk (x(t))2;
7 gN+1 = µ · gN +
∑K
k=1 wk ∇x(s)+∆xN J
N
k
(
T
(
x(s)+∆xN ;p
)
,x(t )
)
‖∑Kk=1 wk ∇x(s)+∆xN JNk (T (x(s)+∆xN ;p),x(t ))‖ ;
8 x(s) + ∆xN+1 = Cx(s),ε(x(s) + ∆xN + sign (gN+1);
9 end
Output: Adversarial example xadv = x(s) + ∆xNmax .
as DFANet-DI-M-FIM and is shown in Algorithm 2. In Al-
gorithm 2, T (x; p) is the stochastic image transform function
(e.g., resizing, cropping and rotating), creating diverse input
patterns [20] to improve the transferability:
T (x; p) =
{
T (x) with probability p
x with probability 1 − p . (14)
Finally, we describe the most complex one: the combination
of DFANet, model ensemble method, diverse input method,
the momentum boosting method, and FIM, referred to as
DFANet-E-DI-M-FIM. Algorithm 3 details DFANet-E-DI-M-
FIM, where instead of optimizing a single face model J, we
apply model ensemble method by attacking K models. In
addition, the feature loss functions in Line 4 of Algorithm 1,
Algorithm 2 and Line 6 of Algorithm 3 can be replaced as
those for positive pairs, but for convenience, we input negative
pairs as examples here.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first explore applicable strategies of
adversarial attacks towards deep face models, from label-level
attacks to feature-level attacks to select a baseline method for
further study. Then we conduct experiments on state-of-the-
art face models with various training databases, training loss
functions and network architectures to evaluate the proposed
DFANet. Finally, we apply the DFANet to the LFW database
and generate new face pairs with adversarial perturbations,
called the TALFW database. We use the LFW and TALFW
databases to evaluate the robustness of mainstream open-
sourced deep face models, commercial APIs and defensive
methods.
A. Experimental Settings and Evaluation Protocol
We use target adversarial examples to evaluate transferabil-
ity since target attacks are more difficult to transfer between
deep models [17]. (1) First, we selected 100 source images
from MS-Celeb-1M [32] and 100 target images from VG-
GFace2 [34] to generate 10,000 pairs, which are originally
judged as negative pairs. Some of the source and target images
are shown in Fig. 2, where the first line shows the source
images, the second line shows the corresponding adversarial
examples generated by DFANet-E-DI-M-FIM, and the third
line shows target images. Therefore, the goal of the attack is
to generate adversarial examples from the source images to be
disguised as target ones. Specifically, the goal is to obtain face
embedding representations of source images closer to those of
target images than the distance threshold of a face recognition
system. (2) Next, we define the threshold tm of a face model
m. Using 6,000 face pairs from the LFW database [8], we
compute the Euclidean distance of normalized deep features
to obtain ROC curves. Then we identify distance thresholds
for judging whether a pair is positive or negative. Since we
would like to compare the adversarial robustness of the trained
models with real-world applications, we define the distance
threshold for attacking (or distinguishing a positive and a
negative pair) to have a low false acceptance rate (FAR =
1e−3). An attack is defined as a success (hit) if the embedding
7distance between the source image and target is less than the
threshold. We use the average hit rate of the Np = 10, 000 face
pairs to report the transferable attack success (hit) rate:
Hit Rate (%) = 100 × 1
Np
Np∑
i=1
1
[F (x(s)i ) − F (x(t)i )2 < tm] .
(15)
The higher the hit rate is, the stronger the transferability of
the attack.
Fig. 2. The first line shows some of the source images, the second line shows
the corresponding adversarial examples generated by DFANet-E-DI-M-FIM
with ε = 10 and the third line lists some of the target images. We generate
a total of 10,000 pairs from the 100 source images and 100 target images,
which were originally judged as negative pairs.
To simulate potential scenarios, we aim to increase the
difference between the source and target models by attacking
deep face models with different training datasets, training loss
functions, and network architectures. The first setting is attacks
between models with different training databases. Specifically,
we use the four mainstream training databases in the deep face
recognition literature, namely, CAISA-WebFace [33], MS-
Celeb-1M [32], VGGFace2 [34] and IMDb-Face [35], to train
a modified version [7] of a ResNet-50 [36] model supervised
by softmax loss. The statistics for the four training databases
are listed in Table A1. The second setting is attacks between
models with different training loss functions. We use the
softmax loss, triplet loss [2], CosFace [6] and ArcFace [7]
in the experiment. Then the third setting is attacks between
models with different architectures. We use the modified ver-
sion [7] of ResNet [36], the modified version [7] of squeeze-
and-excitation Network (SENet) [39], MobileNet [37], and
Inception-ResNet [38]. To keep it simple, we refer to the
modified version [7] of ResNet and SENet with 50 layers
as ResNet-50 and SENet-50; both use IR blocks [7]. The
recognition performance of these models is listed in Table A2.
B. Experiments for the Baseline Method
To explore adversarial attacks against deep face models and
find a baseline method for further study on transferability
enhancement methods, we compare the attack performance
of applicable adversarial attacks towards deep face models
including label-level and feature-level attacks.
We use FTGSM and ITGSM to generate label-level ad-
versarial examples and FFM and FIM to generate feature-
level adversarial examples. Since we introduced the feature
level in detail earlier, let us clarify something noticeable in
the label-level attacks in deep face recognition. In label-level
attacks, several gradient-based generative strategies, including
FGSM [16], FTGSM [44], BIM [44], and ITGSM [44] have
been proposed in the literature. However, in the deep face
recognition, test identities are usually different from those in
the training databases. We actually cannot always use y(s) and
y(t) for comparison. Therefore, first, we forward propagate the
input images and obtain the output labels l(x(s)) and l(x(t)).
In the following label-level adversarial attacks, we use l(x(s))
and l(x(t)) to replace y(s) and y(t) in FTGSM (Equation (2))
and ITGSM (Equation (4)). Specifically, the maximum de-
viation of perturbations ε is set to 10. Correspondingly, the
number of iterations for ITGSM and FIM are chosen to be
min(ε+4, 1.25ε) ≈ 13. We use four aforementioned deep face
models trained on different training databases.
The experimental results are shown in Table I. In terms
of the transferability of the black-box attacks, feature-level
attacks (FFM and FIM) are much more effective than label-
level attacks (FTGSM and ITGSM) at the same constraint
level. In fact, the lack of accurate labels and the large number
of categories not only increase the difficulty of label-level
attacks but also reduce the similarity between the source and
target models. Instead, the embedding space of deep face
models share more similarities, which benefits the transfer-
ability of adversarial attacks. These properties may explain
why feature-level attacks are more transferable than label-
level attacks to some extent. In addition, for both label-level
and feature-level attacks, iterative methods (ITGSM, FIM) are
much more effective than fast methods (FTGSM, FFM) at the
same constraint level. Taken together, we choose FIM as the
baseline method in the following experiments.
C. Strong Baseline and DFANet
As Table I shows, with the basic iterative label-level and
feature-level method, it is still hard to guarantee the consistent
success of transferable adversarial attacks against deep face
models. Therefore, we intend to incorporate the transferability
enhancement method [17], [19], [20] into the baseline method,
FIM, to serve as a strong baseline. In addition, we propose a
new DFANet method to further improve the transferability.
Apart from deep face models trained on different training
databases, we also experiment using deep face models trained
with different loss functions and network architectures. We
first extend attack methods from FIM to DFANet-FIM, from
M-FIM to DFANet-M-FIM, and from DI-M-FIM to DFANet-
DI-M-FIM. Specifically, the maximum deviation of perturba-
tions ε is set to 10. For integrating momentum terms, the decay
factor µ is set to 1. For the method of incorporating diverse
input patterns, we introduce several transformations including
translation, rotation and scaling. The transformation probabil-
ity p is set to 1 as in the original paper to reach the maximum
transferability. In addition, we also try adding Gaussian noise
but it has little effect. For the proposed DFANet, the maximum
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TRANSFERABLE ADVERSARIAL SUCCESS (HIT) RATE OF LABEL-LEVEL
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATED BY FTGSM AND ITGSM, AND
FEATURE-LEVEL ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATED BY FFM AND
FIM BETWEEN FOUR DEEP FACE MODELS OF DIFFERENT TRAINING
DATABASES(CAISA-WEBFACE [33], MS-CELEB-1M [32],
VGGFACE2 [34] AND IMDB-FACE [35]) AND SUPERVISED BY THE
SOFTMAX LOSS.
Method Src ↓ | Tar → WebFace IMDB-Face VGGFace2 MS1M
FTGSM [44]
WebFace / 1.85% 1.18% 1.37%
IMDB-Face 2.84% / 1.87% 2.42%
VGGFace2 13.16% 12.80% / 10.74%
MS1M 5.80% 6.87% 4.94% /
ITGSM [44]
WebFace / 2.00% 1.25% 1.17%
IMDB-Face 4.03% / 2.34% 2.27%
VGGFace2 31.92% 28.00% / 16.01%
MS1M 15.20% 18.34% 11.65% /
FFM [64]
WebFace / 9.44% 7.47% 6.11%
IMDB-Face 15.76% / 9.99% 11.50%
VGGFace2 23.60% 19.11% / 15.18%
MS1M 14.05% 14.71% 10.54% /
FIM [64]
WebFace / 11.10% 7.29% 4.95%
IMDB-Face 30.90% / 15.67% 12.71%
VGG2 65.95% 53.90% / 32.24%
MS1M 36.43% 37.57% 25.19% /
iterative step Nmax is set to 1,500, the drop rate pd of ResNet-
50 and SENet-50 model is set to 0.1, pd of MobileNet model
is set to 0.025 and pd of Inception-ResNet model is set
to 0.05. We will discuss the effects of hyperparameters pd
and Nmax in the following experiments. The experimental
results from FIM to DFANet-FIM, from M-FIM to DFANet-
M-FIM, and from DI-M-FIM to DFANet-DI-M-FIM are listed
in Table II, Table III and Table IV. We can see a constant
improvement, from FIM to DFANet-FIM, from M-FIM to
DFANet-M-FIM, and from DI-M-FIM to DFANet-DI-M-FIM
in terms of the hit rate between deep face models trained with
different loss functions and network architectures. Compared
with the strong baseline DI-M-FIM, DFANet-DI-M-FIM still
achieves significant improvement. In addition, compared with
the initial FIM, most of the successful hit rates of adversarial
examples generated by DFANet-DI-M-FIM between the four
models have been improved to approximately 90%.
Furthermore, to evaluate the ability of DFANet to enhance
the model ensemble method, we generate adversarial examples
using E-DI-M-FIM and DFANet-E-DI-M-FIM, and apply this
attacks towards a commercial API, Face++ [28]. Specifically,
we generate three groups of attacks: the first group combines
three ResNet-50 models trained on WebFace and supervised by
the softmax loss, CosFace, and ArcFace, and the second and
third groups use the VGGFace2 and MS1M models respec-
tively, with these three loss functions. The other parameters
are set as above. We input the generated face pair to Face++,
and the API returns both the similarity of this pair and the
similarity threshold with FAR at 1e-3, 1e-4 and 1e-5. With
the output information as aforementioned, we can calculate
the success (hit) rate as before. We list the results in Table V,
from which we can see that with the combination of DFANet,
the transferability of adversarial attacks generated from E-
DI-M-FIM can be improved further. Above all, the exten-
TABLE II
EVALUATION TRANSFERABILITY ENHANCEMENT METHODS FROM FIM TO
DFANET-FIM, FROM M-FIM TO DFANET-M-FIM, AND FROM
DI-M-FIM TO DFANET-DI-M-FIM. THE METHODS ARE EVALUATED BY
SUCCESS (HIT) RATE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES BETWEEN FOUR DEEP
FACE MODELS (THE RESNET-50 MODEL TRAINED ON
CAISA-WEBFACE [33], MS-CELEB-1M [32], VGGFACE2 [34] AND
IMDB-FACE [35] AND SUPERVISED BY THE SOFTMAX FUNCTION.)
Method Src ↓ | Tar → WebFace IMDB-Face VGGFace2 MS1M
FIM [64]
WebFace / 11.10% 7.29% 4.95%
IMDB-Face 30.90% / 15.67% 12.71%
VGG2 65.95% 53.90% / 32.24%
MS1M 36.43% 37.57% 25.19% /
DFANet-
FIM
WebFace / 46.81% 39.63% 25.82%
IMDB-Face 81.39% / 67.31% 58.70%
VGGFace2 91.91% 88.01% / 75.91%
MS1M 64.38% 67.06% 54.56% /
M-FIM
[19][64]
WebFace / 26.81% 22.14% 14.52%
IMDB-Face 49.86% / 36.57% 31.24%
VGGFace2 66.57% 55.76% / 42.81%
MS1M 43.43% 43.52% 36.43% /
DFANet-
M-FIM
WebFace / 80.73% 80.16% 58.85%
IMDB-Face 95.18% / 92.14% 85.31%
VGGFace2 96.08% 93.23% / 87.30%
MS1M 84.66% 86.40% 82.78% /
DI-M-FIM
[20][19][64]
WebFace / 73.92% 74.05% 50.22%
IMDB-Face 88.82% / 84.01% 71.53%
VGGFace2 91.86% 88.31% / 78.31%
MS1M 80.15% 82.63% 80.72% /
DFANet-
DI-M-FIM
WebFace / 85.57% 84.52% 64.00%
IMDB 96.10% / 92.90% 84.86%
VGGFace2 96.76% 93.48% / 86.29%
MS1M 92.19% 92.90% 90.05% /
TABLE III
EVALUATION TRANSFERABILITY ENHANCEMENT METHODS FROM FIM TO
DFANET-FIM, FROM M-FIM TO DFANET-M-FIM, AND FROM
DI-M-FIM TO DFANET-DI-M-FIM. THE METHODS ARE EVALUATED BY
THE SUCCESS (HIT) RATE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES BETWEEN FOUR
DEEP FACE MODELS (THE RESNET-50 MODEL TRAINED ON
CAISA-WEBFACE [33] SUPERVISED BY THE SOFTMAX LOSS, TRIPLET
LOSS [2], COSFACE [6] AND ARCFACE [7]).
Method Src ↓ | Tar → Softmax Triplet Loss CosFace ArcFace
FIM [64]
Softmax / 9.92% 20.69% 24.36%
Triplet Loss 27.17% / 57.82% 61.32%
CosFace 11.78% 14.13% / 31.56%
ArcFace 6.43% 7.93% 16.89% /
DFANet-
FIM
Softmax / 42.15% 63.19% 67.90%
Triplet Loss 82.29% / 94.23% 94.84%
CosFace 53.90% 40.92% / 80.08%
ArcFace 46.71% 34.53% 72.53% /
M-FIM
[19][64]
Softmax / 29.46% 38.95% 44.15%
Triplet Loss 36.31% / 67.73% 73.09%
CosFace 21.08% 32.89% / 50.94%
ArcFace 15.18% 24.13% 36.39% /
DFANet-
M-FIM
Softmax / 80.16% 89.71% 91.01%
Triplet Loss 89.85% / 97.56% 97.81%
CosFace 72.69% 70.28% / 92.55%
ArcFace 77.36% 73.18% 93.32% /
DI-M-FIM
[20][19][64]
Softmax / 73.39% 86.09% 87.22%
Triplet Loss 84.94% / 95.55% 96.67%
CosFace 74.36% 81.79% / 93.21%
ArcFace 76.09% 84.20% 93.94% /
DFANet-
DI-M-FIM
Softmax / 82.50% 91.77% 92.55%
Triplet Loss 91.81% / 97.70% 98.34%
CosFace 82.32% 88.41% / 95.72%
ArcFace 82.59% 88.76% 95.59% /
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EVALUATION TRANSFERABILITY ENHANCEMENT METHODS FROM FIM TO
DFANET-FIM, FROM M-FIM TO DFANET-M-FIM, AND FROM
DI-M-FIM TO DFANET-DI-M-FIM. THE METHOD ARE EVALUATED BY
THE SUCCESS (HIT) RATE OF THE ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES BETWEEN
FOUR DEEP FACE MODELS (TRAINED ON CAISA-WEBFACE [33] USE THE
SOFTMAX LOSS WITH DIFFERENT NETWORK ARCHITECTURES INCLUDING
RESNET-50 [36], SENET-50 [39], MOBILENET [37], AND
INCEPTION-RESNET [38]).
Method Src ↓ | Tar → ResNet-50 SENet-50 MobileNet Incep-ResNet
FIM [64]
ResNet-50 / 39.91% 13.46% 11.62%
SENet-50 52.13% / 18.49% 15.32%
MobileNet 12.92% 12.76% / 4.19%
Incep-ResNet 18.54% 17.84% 9.32% /
DFANet-
FIM
ResNet-50 / 90.76% 67.51% 54.20%
SENet-50 88.62% / 49.59% 36.62%
MobileNet 36.28% 36.38% / 11.74%
Incep-ResNet 41.50% 40.66% 23.57% /
M-FIM
[19][64]
ResNet-50 / 65.43% 29.77% 27.68%
SENet-50 77.48% / 37.57% 34.46%
MobileNet 32.82% 33.50% / 13.52%
Incep-ResNet 35.89% 36.34% 20.18% /
DFANet-
M-FIM
ResNet-50 / 99.17% 92.41% 86.14%
SENet-50 98.24% / 78.58% 67.79%
MobileNet 62.14% 64.45% / 27.78%
Incep-ResNet 62.15% 62.92% 41.59% /
DI-M-FIM
[20][19][64]
ResNet-50 / 98.76% 84.16% 78.14%
SENet-50 99.02% / 85.56% 77.95%
MobileNet 85.94% 87.30% / 54.24%
Incep-ResNet 83.61% 83.59% 65.03% /
DFANet-
DI-M-FIM
ResNet-50 / 99.68% 92.77% 87.61%
SENet-50 99.53% / 94.22% 88.41%
MobileNet 92.07% 92.01% / 64.80%
Incep-ResNet 88.98% 88.56% 73.44% /
TABLE V
EVALUATION TRANSFERABILITY ENHANCEMENT METHODS FROM
E-DI-M-FIM TO DFANET-E-DI-M-FIM. THE METHODS ARE
EVALUATED BY THE TRANSFERABLE ADVERSARIAL SUCCESS (HIT) RATE
OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON FACE++ [28].
Method Surrogate Models
Hit Rate@FAR
1e-5 1e-4 1e-3
E-DI-M-FIM
[17][20][19][64]
ResNet-50,WebFace
(Softmax,CosFace,ArcFace)
51.90% 67.20% 80.50%
DFANet-
E-DI-M-FIM
ResNet-50,WebFace
(Softmax,CosFace,ArcFace)
56.70% 69.80% 83.80%
E-DI-M-FIM
[17][20][19][64]
ResNet-50,VGGFace2
(Softmax,CosFace,ArcFace)
67.19% 76.99% 86.49%
DFANet-
E-DI-M-FIM
ResNet-50,VGGFace2
(Softmax,CosFace,ArcFace)
71.29% 80.50% 88.30%
E-DI-M-FIM
[17][20][19][64]
ResNet-50,MS1M
(Softmax,CosFace,ArcFace)
68.50% 76.29% 83.59%
DFANet-
E-DI-M-FIM
ResNet-50,MS1M
(Softmax,CosFace,ArcFace)
73.70% 81.69% 88.40%
sive experiments on the face models with different training
databases, loss functions and network architectures, shown in
Table II, Table III and Table V, convincingly demonstrate the
effectiveness of DFANet based on the strong baseline.
D. Ablation Studies
We conduct ablation experiments to study the impact of
hyperparameters including the drop rate pd and the maximum
number of iterations Nmax , for a better understanding of the
proposed DFANet.
Fig. 3. The success (hit) rates of the transferable adversarial attacks when
varying the drop rate pd . The adversarial examples are generated from model
by DFANet-DI-M-FIM. Note that DFANet-DI-M-FIM degrades into DI-M-
FIM when the drop rate is pd = 0. The source models are trained on different
architectures: MobileNet, ResNet-50, SENet-50, and Inception-ResNet.
We first study the influence of the drop rate pd on the
success (hit) rates. We generate transferable adversarial exam-
ples of the four models trained on WebFace supervised by the
softmx loss, with different architectures, namely, ResNet-50,
SENet-50, MobileNet and Inception-ResNet, using DFANet-
DI-M-FIM. We set the maximum number of iterations Nmax
to 1500 and then change the drop rate pd . Note that DFANet-
DI-M-FIM degrades into the baseline method, DI-M-FIM,
when the drop rate is pd = 0. The results are shown in
Fig. 3. We find that the success (hit) rate first increases and
then decreases with increasing the drop rate pd . This finding
indicates that a certain degree of randomness incorporated into
the convolutional layers would help, but applying excessive
randomness would have a negative effect. The optimal drop
rate pd may vary across different architectures. In addition, the
change curves of similar architectures ResNet-50 and SENet-
50 are also similar.
Fig. 4. The success (hit) rates of transferable adversarial attacks when varying
the maximum number of iterations Nmax . The adversarial examples are
generated by FIM, M-FIM, DI-M-FIM and DFANet-DI-M-FIM using the
ResNet-50 model trained on WebFace and supervised by the softmax loss.
We then study the influence of the maximum number
of iterations Nmax on the success (hit) rates. We generate
transferable adversarial examples of ResNet-50 model trained
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on WebFace supervised by the softmx loss, using FIM, M-
FIM, DI-M-FIM and DFANet-DI-M-FIM. Since we find that
the optimal value of the drop rate pd for ResNet-50 is
approximately 0.1, we maintain it as 0.1 and then change
the maximum number of iterations Nmax from 13 to 1500.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 4. We see that,
the success (hit) rates for both DI-M-FIM and DFANet-DI-
M-FIM improve as the maximum number of iterations Nmax
increases. Although at the beginning, the success (hit) rate of
DFANet-DI-M-FIM is lower, it gains more improvements and
outperforms DI-M-FIM as Nmax increases. In addition, the
trends in FIM and M-FIM are different from those in DI-M-
FIM and DFANet-DI-M-FIM, where as the maximum number
of iterations Nmax increases, the success (hit) rate remains
almost unchanged. It is not hard to see the reason that, with
more iterations, the proposed method could further increase the
diversity of the generated DFANet models and obtain better
ensemble effects.
E. Discussion
To achieve more intuitive understanding of the transfer-
able adversarial attacks and the proposed DFANet, we next
interpret the intermediate generation process of adversarial
example.
Since for deep face recognition, positive and negative pairs
are judged according to the distances between their deep
features, we observe the Euclidean distance of the normalized
deep features in the generation process, which is also the
objective loss function of feature-level attacks (referred to
Equation (7)(8)). First, we pick 100 face pairs randomly
from the aforementioned 10,000 face pairs. Then, we generate
adversarial examples from the ResNet-50 model trained on
WebFace supervised by the softmax loss, using FIM, M-FIM,
DFANet-FIM, DI-M-FIM and DFANet-DI-M-FIM. At the end
of each iteration, we extract the deep features of the source
model and three other target models, which are three ResNet-
50 models trained on IMDb-Face, VGGFace2, MS1M and
supervised by the softmax loss. For both source model and
target models, as the number of iterations increases, we record
the average normalized Euclidean distances of the 100 face
pairs, as shown in Fig. 5.
We can see two phenomena from the figure. (1) We first
focus on the average normalized Euclidean distances of the
source model. For FIM and M-FIM, the average normalized
Euclidean distances of the source models decrease constantly
as the number of iterations increases. For DFANet-FIM, DI-M-
FIM and DFANet-DI-M-FIM, although in the long term, the
average normalized Euclidean distances of the source model
decrease overall as the number of iterations increases; there
are high fluctuations of these distances in a short term. The
fluctuations reflect the ensemble effects of the DFANet and DI
method. DFANet obtain diversity of different surrogate models
generated by dropout, while the DI method obtains diversity of
the input images, which both lead to a variety of gradients and
therefore prevent overfitting to the single-source model. (2) In
the figure, there exists a gap between the average normalized
Euclidean distances for source models and those for target
models under any method. We can see that for DFANet-DI-M-
FIM, the performance of the source model is almost consistent
with that of the target models, which reflects the advantage of
the combination of DFANet and the strong baseline method,
because the smaller these gaps are, the more transferable the
generated adversarial examples are.
Fig. 5. The average Euclidean distance of normalized deep features of 100
face pairs as the number of iterations increases. We provide two types of deep
features: one type is extracted from the source model, while the other one is
extracted from three target models. The adversarial examples are generated
by FIM, M-FIM, DFANet-FIM, DI-M-FIM and DFANet-DI-M-FIM.
F. TALFW Database
We have thoroughly investigated adversarial attack methods
against deep face recognition in this paper. With the help
of transferability enhancement methods, the success (hit) rate
can be as high as almost 90%, which should raise security
concerns for deep face models. Therefore, we aim to build
a test benchmark to facilitate research on the robustness and
generalization of face recognition. The Labeled Faces in the
Wild (LFW) [8] database is a well-known test benchmark in
the deep face recognition literature. Although the performance
on the LFW database has been saturated, due to its ease
of use and popularity, there may be a potential possibility
for it to become an appropriate baseline for studying the
robustness issue. In this section, based on the aforementioned
transferable adversarial attack methods, we create the Trans-
ferable Adversarial LFW (TALFW)1 database by adding noise
imperceptible to human to the original LFW images. Since
the only difference is the imperceptible noise, the evaluation
protocol of TALFW is exactly the same as that of LFW, which
will make it an easy-to-use and outstanding test database for
the community.
Based on the aforementioned methods, we modify the
original Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [8] database using
our private models. This modified database could be used to
evaluate the robustness of mainstream open-sourced deep face
models and commercial APIs. The original LFW database
contains 13,233 face images of 5,749 identities. In the recent
literature, the LFW database has been widely used to evaluate
the performance of deep face models by testing on 3,000
1http://www.whdeng.cn/TALFW/index.html
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Fig. 6. Ten positive (left) and ten negative (right) pairs in the TALFW database. The similarity scores of commercial APIs, namely, Amazon [25], Microsoft [26],
Baidu [27] and Face++ [28] are also listed. The modification is nearly imperceptible(1.34 ± 0.32, measured by the root mean squared deviation) to humans
but can change the face similarity scores significantly in the black-box setting without queries.
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positive and 3,000 negative face pairs, which involve 7,701
face images. Therefore, considering the evaluation protocol
of the LFW database, the principal is to modify the face
image in the pixel space slightly while significantly change the
similarity of the corresponding face pairs in the deep feature
space of unknown models.
The steps to set up the Transferable Adversarial Labeled
Faces in the Wild (TALFW) database are as follows. First,
based on the greedy algorithm, we choose the minimum num-
ber of candidate face images to cover the maximum number
of face pairs. Then we modify the candidate images in an
imperceptible way. Apart from the aforementioned transferable
attack methods, we also use some techniques to reduce the
visual impact of the modification. In total, 4,069 face images
are modified and compared with the original LFW database
which has 3,000 positive and 3,000 negative face pairs. The
average perturbation is only 1.34 ± 0.32, measured by the
root mean squared deviation. Additionally, we evaluate the
robustness of the four commercial APIs and four state-of-the-
art (SOTA) open-sourced models on the TALFW database and
the original LFW database. Fig. 6 shows ten positive (left)
and ten negative (right) face pairs in the TALFW database.
We also list the similarity score of the four commercial APIs:
Amazon [25], Microsoft [26], Baidu [27] and Face++ [28].
From the figures, the modification is nearly imperceptible to
humans but can change the face similarity score significantly
in the black-box setting without queries.
We first test open source models of SOTA algorithms,
i.e., the center-loss [3], SphereFace [4], VGGFace2 [34] and
ArcFace [7]. The ArcFace (ResNet-100) model has reported
SOTA performance on several benchmarks including YTF,
MegaFace challenge, and IJB-C [7]. We use MTCNN for
face detection and strictly follow the preprocessing steps of
the original algorithms. Compared with the original images
in the LFW database, the perturbed images in the TALFW
database have no influence on the accuracy and reliability
of face detection. The accuracy of open-sourced models of
the four SOTA algorithms on the LFW and TALFW databses
is listed in the first cell of Table VI. From the experimental
results, there indeed exists a striking gap between the accuracy
on the LFW and TALFW databases, which reflects that even
the SOTA algorithms for deep face recognition are extremely
vulnerable to transferable attacks.
Then we tested LFW and TALFW on the commercial
APIs including Amazon [25], Microsoft [26], Baidu [27]
and Face++ [28]. Specifically, since the TALFW database is
generated based on transferability, we obtain the similarity
score only by once calling without any query feedback. We
also have no knowledge about the whole pipelines of the
commercial APIs. We only need to give the original images in
both the LFW and TALFW database to the commercial APIs
directly without any image preprocessing, and then we get the
similarity score. The performance of the four commercial APIs
on the LFW and TALFW databases is listed in the second cell
of Table VI. All the commercial APIs deteriorate seriously
when transferring from the LFW database to the TALFW
database, which reflects the idea that transferable adversarial
attacks seriously threaten commercial face APIs.
TABLE VI
EVALUATION RESULTS OF THE COMMERCIAL APIS, SOTA ALGORITHMS
AND EFENSIVE MODELS.
Model LFW TALFW
SOTA
Algorithms
Center-loss [3] 98.78 70.65
SphereFace [4] 99.27 62.47
VGGFace2 [34] 99.43 71.47
ArcFace (MobileNet) [7] 99.35 50.77
ArcFace (ResNet-100) [7] 99.82 63.45
Commercial
APIs
Amazon [25] 99.47 69.28
Microsoft [26] 98.12 70.93
Baidu [27] 97.72 72.07
Face++ [28] 96.95 73.90
Fusion of four APIs 99.65 72.33
Defensive
Methods
No Defense 99.78 54.15
JPEG Encoding [44] 99.55 73.93
Gaussian Blur [44] 99.57 77.95
Adversarial Training [40] 99.62 82.17
Fig. 7. Comparison of the LFW and TALFW databases. We select some
algorithms as example here: the fusion of commercial APIs (Amazon [25],
Microsoft [26], Baidu [27] and Face++ [28]), the SOTA model trained on
MS1M with ResNet-100 supervised by ArcFace, and a defensive method by
adversarial training [40].
Furthermore, we test some defensive methods including
JPEG encoding [44], Gaussian blur [44], and adversarial
training [40]. The compared no-defense model is a ResNet-
50 [36] model trained on MS-Celeb-1M [32] with ArcFace
loss [7]. There has been a consensus that the improvement
in robustness would bring performance degradation on clean
test images [44], [69], [70], [71]. Since we aim to evaluate
the robustness of deep face models while at the same time
keeping the recognition performance of original images at a
relatively high level, we check the performance of defensive
models on the TALFW database while keep the accuracy on
the LFW database no less than 99.50%. We determin the
hyperparameters for prospective defensive methods and choose
models for adversarial training methods following this rule.
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For JPEG encoding, the JPEG quality is chosen to be level 20
(out of 100); and for the Gaussian blur, the kernel size is set to
5 with standard deviation 2. Adversarial examples incorporated
into adversarial training are generated by FIM since they are
more effective in face models than label-level methods. From
the results, we find that compared with the original model,
which only has 54.15% accuracy on the TALFW database,
although defensive methods can improve the performance to
different degrees, the performance gap between the LFW and
TALFW databases still exists, which reflects the idea that
transferable adversarial attacks could be alleviated but there
is still plenty of scope to push the corresponding techniques
further.
We have evaluated the robustness of mainstream open-
sourced deep face models, commercial APIs and defensive
methods on the LFW and TALFW databases. Some typical
comparison ROC curves are selected in Fig. 7. Overall, the
severe performance degradation from the LFW to TALFW
databases clearly shows the vulnerability of deep face models.
V. CONCLUSION
As the recognition performance of deep face models im-
proves, robustness and generalization have become increas-
ingly essential and crucial. In this paper, we study applicable
transferable adversarial attacks against deep face models. We
first find a baseline method by exploring the attack methods
from the label-level to the feature-level and demonstrate em-
pirically that iterative feature-level attacks are more effective
and transferable. We find that it is difficult to guarantee
successful attacks on deep face models with basic iterative ad-
versarial attacks. Therefore we study transferability enhance-
ment methods and propose the DFANet method to further
improve transferability by increasing the possible settings of
the network parameters and combining the possible networks
in the iterative steps. The experimental results demonstrate
that the proposed method can be combined with various
networks and existing transferability enhancement methods,
which achieve effective black-box adversarial attacks against
deep face models with different training databases, loss func-
tions and network architectures. Based on the aforementioned
study, we contribute a test database, TALFW, to help study the
robustness and defensibility of deep face models. The hope
is that TALFW database could raise much attentions from
researchers and industries in a timely manner.
APPENDIX A
OTHER INFORMATION OF MODELS IN THE PAPER
The statistics for the four training databases are listed in
Table A1.
We show the recognition performance of the face models
in this paper in Table A2, where the recognition performance
is evaluated on several popular benchmarks: LFW [8] and
YTF [72]. LFW database contains 13233 face images from
5,749 different identities, which is popular and widely used for
evaluation. YTF is a database of face videos collected from
YouTube, which consists of 3,425 videos of 1,595 different
people. We follow the unrestricted with labeled outside data
protocol on these test databases.
TABLE A1
STATISTICS FOR TRAINING DATABASES INLUDING
CAISA-WEBFACE [33], MS-CELEB-1M [32], VGGFACE2 [34] AND
IMDB-FACE [35]. NOTE THAT THIS IMDB-FACE IS A INCOMPLETE
VERSION, COMPARED WITH 1.7M IMAGES IN THE ORIGINAL PAPER,
BECAUSE SOME OF THE IMAGE URLS THROW A 404 ERROR.
MS-CELEB-1M IS A REFINED VERSION COMPARED WITH THE ORIGINAL
ONE WITH 10M IMAGES.
database Source #Identities #Images
CAISA-WebFace [33] IMDb 10,575 0.49M
IMDb-Face [35] IMDb 51,348 1.4M
VGGFace2 [34] Search Engine 9,131 3.3M
MS-Celeb-1M [32] Search Engine 84,164 3.8M
TABLE A2
RECOGNITION PERFORMANCE ON LFW [8] AND YTF [72] OF DEEP FACE
MODELS WITH DIFFERENT TRAINING DATABASES
(CAISA-WEBFACE [33], MS-CELEB-1M [32], VGGFACE2 [34] AND
IMDB-FACE [35]), LOSS FUNCTIONS(THE SOFTMAX LOSS, TRIPLET
LOSS [2], COSFACE [6] AND ARCFACE [7]) AND NETWORK
ARCHITECTURES (THE MODIFIED VERSION [7] OF RESNET [36], THE
MODIFIED VERSION [7] OF SQUEEZE-AND-EXCITATION NETWORK
(SENET) [39], MOBILENET [37], AND INCEPTION-RESNET [38]).
Face Models LFW YTF
Database
ResNet-50,WebFace,Softmax 99.25 94.74
ResNet-50,IMDB-Face,Softmax 99.53 96.66
ResNet-50,VGGFace2,Softmax 99.55 96.92
ResNet-50,MS1M,Softmax 99.57 96.28
Loss
ResNet-50,WebFace,Softmax 99.25 94.74
ResNet-50,WebFace,Triplet 99.45 95.52
ResNet-50,WebFace,ArcFace 99.52 95.66
ResNet-50,WebFace,CosFace 99.53 95.76
Architecture
MobileNet,WebFace,Softmax 99.12 94.24
ResNet-50,WebFace,Softmax 99.25 94.74
SENet-50,WebFace,Softmax 99.13 95.20
Inception-ResNet,WebFace,Softmax 99.37 95.42
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